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I. INTRODUCTION
Nogales, Mexico is a city along the United States and Mexico border
that is often referred to as "Paradise Lost."' This once remote and
beautiful city, located at the corner of where Mexico meets Arizona, has
become home to poverty, disease and pollution.2 In the past twenty-five
years, over two thousand manufacturing plants, called maquiladoras, have
moved into the Nogales area creating jobs and economic opportunity, but
also creating a "cesspool and breeding ground for infectious disease" and
pollution.3 Nogales is no longer the beautiful place residents remember.
The maquiladora program was established by the Mexican
government to encourage United States companies to bring their plants to
the Mexican side of the border.4 These American companies are allowed
to import raw materials into Mexico without paying duties and to export the
finished product back to the United States, subject to a low value-added
customs duty. 5 Under this system, United States companies are able to
make goods at lower costs and Mexicans are able to find work. However,
the maquiladora plants have lowered their manufacturing costs by
circumventing mandatory environmental regulations. 6
A 1992 study
indicated that only five percent of these plants returned their waste to the
United States for proper disposal. In communities with maquiladoras,
people fear that hazardous conditions exist in the air, soil and water. 7
1.
Diego Ribadeneira, SIDEBAR On Mexico's Border, 'Prosperity' Has an Ugly Side,
BOSTON GLOBE, July 12, 1994, at 10.
2.
Id.
3.
Id.
4.

Lawrence J. Rowe, NAFTA, the Border Area Environmental Program and Mexico's

Border Area: Prescriptionfor SustainableDevelopment?, 18 SuFFoLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 197,
198 (1995);
Some maquiladora plants are Japanese-owned as well. Lynn A. Stanton, A
Comparative Analysis of the NAFTA's Environmental Side Agreement, 2 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J.
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 71, 72 (1994).

5.
6"

Stanton, supra note 4, at 72.
Id.; Sanford E. Gaines, Bridges to a Better Environment: Building Cross-Border

Institutionsfor Environmental Improvement in the U.S.-Mexico Border Area, 12 ARJZ. J. INT'L &
COMP. LAw 429, 430 (1995).
7.

Ribadeneira, supra note 1, at 10.
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Waste is returned to the United States because Mexico does not have
proper treatment facilities to treat the hazardous materials.'
This environmental pollution has damaging impact on Nogales,
Arizona. Air samples from Nogales show very high levels of carcinogens.
Also, there are high rates of cancer and lupus in the area. 9 In fact, there
were sixteen cancer cases in fourteen homes on one street in Nogales.' °
Since the creation of the maquiladorasystem in 1965," the border area has
become an environmental nightmare and attempts to remedy the situation
have little political support. To combat border area pollution, the United
States, Mexico, and Canada created the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation in 1993.2 This agreement was adopted to
promote environmental protection through cooperation between the three
member countries.
A.

InternationalCooperation
The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation is an
attempt to restore a necessary balance between economic growth and
environmental protection. Nations are very dependent upon one another
for goods, services, investments, etc.' 3 It is these transactions solidified on
paper that keep the world economy flourishing. Examples include the
North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (hereinafter "NAFTA") and the
European Union (hereinafter "EU"), two international trade entities created
to promote economic growth and cooperation through few or no trade
barriers. 4 Also, international environmental agreements such as the
United States - Canada Air Quality Agreement and the Nordic Convention
show that one country cannot control and resolve all of its environmental
problems on its own.
The environment does not honor national

8.
Id.
9.
Id.
10. Id.
11.
Rowe, supra note 4, at 198.
12. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, opened for signature
Sept. 8, 1993, Ca.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 1480 [hereinafter NAAEC]. NAAEC is a side
agreement under the North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Ca.-Mex.-U.S., 32
I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter the NAFTA].
13. NAFTA, supra note 12, at 447.
14. Beth Ann Bivona, What Price are We Willing to Pay for Our Environment?, 5 J.
INT'L L. & PRAc. 161 (1996); Christian Zacker, Environmental Law of the European Economic
Community: New Power Under the Single European Act, 14 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 249,
251 (1991).
15. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of Canada on Air Quality, March 13, 1991, U.S.-Can., T.I.A.S. No. 11783
[hereinafter Air Quality Agreement]; Denmark-Finland-Norway-Sweden: Convention on the
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boundaries. 16 Even though many countries create standards to improve
their environmental conditions, pollution in border areas is often the
responsibility of more then one country. These responsible countries need
to work together and cooperate in order to protect these areas. Economic
growth and environmental protection cannot be achieved without
international cooperation. However, with cooperation, strategies may be
adopted to help create a balance between the two.
1. The United States Environmental Protection Agency
The Environmental Protection Agency (hereinafter "EPA") has been a
central figure in international environmental protection.
The EPA's
mission is to promote human health and environmental protection along
with "sustainable economic activity in a cost-effective manner." 7 A key to
the EPA's achievement of its mission is international cooperation. 8 The
EPA provides training and information regarding environmental regulation
to other countries. 19 For example, the EPA has provided Mexico with
drinking water treatment technologies in order to make Mexican water safe
to drink.' The EPA's actions and the cooperation of other countries have
enabled this organization to make a significant difference regarding
international environmental concerns.
2. The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
As illustrated in the introduction, the border area has become a serious
environmental concern. This paper analyzes the effectiveness of the
National Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
(hereinafter
"NAAEC") and its dispute resolution process. Recommendations will also
be provided regarding how this process may better serve the NAAEC's
goals.
Overall, the NAAEC provides an effective means of environmental
protection. However, this agreement is not perfect. In assessing the
NAAEC and recommending reforms, it is important to recall that this
agreement was created to address the problem of pollution in the border
area and the need to make Mexico enforce its environmental laws. Since
1889, the United States, Mexico, and Canada have attempted to create
environmental agreements to address environmental concerns. However,
Protection,

Feb.

19,

1974,

Den.-Fin.-Nor.-Sweden,

13 I.L.M.

591

[hereinafter

Nordic

Convention].
16.
Symposium, Managing InternationalEnvironmentalRisk: The Role of Private Parties
in Resolving Public Problems, 18 U. PA. J.INT'L ECON. L. 447-48 (1997).

17.
18.

Id.at 447.
Id.

19.

Id. at 450-51.

20.

Id. at 451.
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many of these plans have failed due to a lack of enforcement and
dedication on the part of all parties involved. The NAAEC is a product of
this period of trial and error and good intentions.
The NAAEC and the NAFTA were not created overnight. The
NAAEC provides a foundation to be built upon and altered in due time. It
is not something that can be severely altered in a short period. Change
needs to occur gradually in order to be accepted and successful. 2' Drastic
change often results in resistance. Major changes to the NAAEC, as many
critics desire, would threaten the foundation that the NAAEC represents
and would frustrate cooperation, which the NAFTA and the NAAEC stand
for. Therefore, the recommendations offered in this paper are classified as
short-term or long-term solutions, indicating their present feasibility. Also,
these recommendations are centered around the NAAEC goal of
cooperation.
This paper will begin with a background discussion to provide the
reader with a frame of reference. Next, a closer look will be taken at the
NAAEC's Commission on Environmental Cooperation (hereinafter
"CEC"), its composition, functions and potential reforms. Finally, the
paper will analyze the NAAEC's dispute resolution process and suggest
possible reforms.
II.BACKGROUND
A.

The North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement
In order to understand how and why the NAAEC was formed, it is
necessary to provide some background information regarding the NAFTA,
the environmental laws and prior agreements of the United States, Mexico
and Canada and the reasons for the NAAEC. The United States, Mexico
and Canada signed the NAFTA agreement in December of 1992 with the
goal of eliminating all restrictions on trade within fifteen years. 22 The
United States and Canada had always kept an arguably open border, but the
21. "Although the pace of legal and economic reform in Russia over the past six years or
so has been breathtaking, it would be naive to expect that formal changes of such magnitude
would be accompanied by similarly rapid changes in social attitudes or in the mindset of the
former Soviet bureaucratic apparatus." Karen Halverson, Resolving Economic Disputes In
Russia's Market Economy, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 59, 93 (1996); "China has approached its goal [a
socialist market economy] gradually, directly opposing the adopted policies of Poland and the
Soviet Union, the former implementing painful and fast shock therapy to change from a centrally
planned economy to a market based economy in one step, and the latter testing many immediately
effective political reforms in the face of economic crisis."
Lyndsey A. Erickson, Gradual
Economic Reform in China, (visited in 1997) <http://www.middlebury.edu/listarchives/ipewt97/0138.html > ; "China's gradual reforms have been the most economically successful." Id.
22. Joel L. Silverman, Note, The "Giant Sucking Sound" Revisited: A Blueprint to
Prevent Pollution Havens by Extending NAFTA's Unheralded "Eco-Dumping" Provisions to the
New World Trade Organization,GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 347, 358 (1994).
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NAFTA forced "Mexico to abandon a legacy of protectionism and
economic nationalism."' In the early 1980s Mexico was facing impending
economic collapse and access to the United States markets was a major
factor in Mexico's economic reform.24 Fearing competition with Mexico
for investment in the United States, Canada decided to join the NAFTA. 5
Therefore, the NAFTA was created in order to promote cooperation and
economic growth.
Proponents of the NAFTA believe that the NAFTA will lower the
amount of pollution generated, improve Mexico's environmental laws and
increase wealth among the member countries. 6 Without the NAFTA,
proponents, mainly businesses, say that the maquiladoraswould increase in
number and continue to pollute.27 They argue that the NAFTA is necessary
in order to establish good relations and cooperation among the three
member countries. Proponents also argue that these good relations will
carry over into attempts to create environmental policy.a
The NAFTA opponents, such as labor organizations and
environmental groups, believe that free trade will increase the depletion of
natural resources and attract polluters to Mexico. 29 They also fear United
States environmental laws may be relaxed because they create trade
barriers and industries will challenge the validity of these laws.3°
Therefore, the NAFTA has created a search for a balance between
economic growth and environmental protection.
Despite these criticisms, the NAFTA does contain environmental
provisions. Chapter Eleven of the NAFTA prohibits the creation of a
"pollution haven" for economic advancement. Many countries felt lax
environmental law enforcement gave Mexico the economic advantage of
lower production costs.3"
Chapter Eleven adopted a "polluter pay
principle," which states a polluter should pay the costs of meeting
environmental regulations.32 In theory, this measure limits Mexico's use of
lax environmental enforcement to allow low production costs.

23.

Id.

24. Michael Robbins, The North American Free Trade Agreement: The Integration of the
Environment, 7 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 123, 127 (1993).

25.
26.

Id. at 127-28.
Rowe, supra note 4, at 216.

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Robbins, supra note 24, at 130.
Id.
Id. at 129.
Rowe, supra note 4, at 216-17.
Silverman, supra note 22, at 367.
Id.
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Other provisions in the NAFTA reflect environmental concerns.33 For
example, Article 904(2) states "each party may pursue its legitimate
objectives of safety or the protection of human, animal or plant life or
health, the environment, or consumers. "14 However, the term "legitimate
objective" is rather vague and dispute panels have interpreted it narrowly.35
Therefore, despite the NAFTA's explicit concern for the environment,
these provisions do not mandate interventions in support of environmental
protection.
Nevertheless, the NAFTA was a step towards further
cooperation between these North American countries, and has provided
them with a basis upon which to address environmental issues.
B.

United States and Mexican EnvironmentalLaws
The environmental laws of the United States and Mexico indicate a
commitment to environmental protection. Although Mexico has been
labeled a lax environmental law enforcer, in 1988, Mexico enacted the
General Law of Ecological Balance and Environmental Protection
(hereinafter "General Law"), which greatly resembles United States law.36
The General Law recognizes that all citizens have a right to a safe and
healthy environment and in order to protect this right those citizens have a
duty to protect the environment.37 Mexican law provides guidelines for
33. "[I]f there is an inconsistency between NAFTA and the Convention of the
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, the Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes, and other agreements listed in Annex 104.1, then these
agreements shall prevail over NAFTA 'to the extent of the inconsistency, provided that where a
party has a choice among equally effective and reasonably available means of complying with such
obligations, the party chooses the alternative that is the lease inconsistent with the other provisions
of [NAFTA].'" Robbins, supra note 24, at 143-44.
34. Id. at 144.
35. Id.
36. Robbins, supra note 24, at 136; In the past it was commonly understood that Mexican
pollution was so pervasive because the industries' actions went unchecked.
Mexican
environmental laws were weak, compared to other countries, and further, governmental
corruption prohibited already ineffective enforcement. Therefore, it was believed that Mexican
pollution was also affecting U.S. air quality. Cameron A. Grant, TransboundaryAir Pollution:
Can NAFTA and NAAEC Succeed Where International Law Has Failed?, 5 CoLO. J. INT'L
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 439, 440 (1994).
37. Robbins, supra note 24, at 136; The General Law gives the Social Development
Secretariat (the "SEDESOL") the responsibility of enforcing and implementing Mexican
environmental law. A 1993 report stated that SEDESOL was given $263 million for enforcement
but that $6.5 billion was needed to reach internationally acceptable pollution levels. Also, a 1992
Congressional survey found that none of the maquiladora plants chosen at random had met the
1988 law requirements and only 5 percent met the requirement to return hazardous waste to the
U.S. for disposal. Nevertheless, there are signs that Mexico is becoming more serious about
environmental protection. Mexico has taken measures to reduce led content in petroleum, closed
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creating regulations, but does not include a superfund program and does

not have the resources to enforce these laws.33 In addition, private citizens
are unable to bring toxic tort or citizen suits to demand enforcement of
environmental laws. 39
All environmental disputes are resolved in
administrative proceedings under Mexico's civil legal system.' °
United States environmental laws consist of independent statutes and
regulations regarding various environmental concerns.'a The EPA enforces
these statutes and creates environmental regulations and standards.4 2
Enforcement is handled through judicial proceedings, civil and criminal

litigation and administrative enforcement. However, the majority of
disputes end in settlement.43 In addition, the United States system, in
contrast to the Mexican system, encourages public participation." Even
though Mexican law differs from United States law, Mexico has shown that
it is concerned about the environment and with greater resources would
have better regulation.45
C.

PriorEnvironmentalAgreements

1. United States and Mexico
Since 1889, the United States, Mexico and Canada have created
several bi-national agreements regarding the environment. 46 In 1944, the
United States and Mexico established the International Boundary Water
oil refineries, is replacing smog producing fuel with natural gas and has increased its budget by
ten times for environmental protection since 1989. Also, the U.S. EPA is training the
SEDESOL. Silverman, supra note 22, at 355-57.
38. Rowe, supra note 4, at 200-01.
39. Silverman, supra note 22, at 357; The NAAEC requires each member country to
.ensure that persons with a legally recognized interest under its law in a particular matter have
appropriate access to administrative, quasi-judicial or judicial proceedings for the enforcement of
the party's environmental laws and regulations." NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 6, 32 I.L.M. at
1484. However, private suits would not be considered "legally recognized" interests in Mexico.
40. Rowe, supra note 4, at 202, 204.
41. Id. at 200.
42. Id. at 204.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Canadian environmental law is very similar to United States law, Canada like the
United States is very experienced in environmental litigation. Grant, supra note 36, at 454.
46. Rowe, supra note 4, at 204-05. The major agreements adopted by the United States
and Mexico are: 1889: The Boundary Waters: Rio Grande and Rio Colorado Convention; 1944:
Utilization of Waters of Colorado and Tijuana Rivers of the Rio Grande Treaty; 1984: La Paz
Agreement, also known as the Cooperation for Improvement of the Environment in the Border
Area Agreement; 1992: the Border Agreement and the NAFTA; 1993: the NAAEC and; 1994:
the BECC/NADB Agreement. Id.
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Commission (hereinafter "IBWC"), which has the power to stop violators,
settle disputes and make recommendations.4 7 However, the IBWC lacked
power and has had little impact.4 In 1984, the La Paz Agreement was
created to promote cooperation between the United States and Mexico. 49 It
was not successful because it did not give the IBWC enforcement powers,
lacked resources and did not establish a dispute resolution process.5 °
Under the La Paz Agreement, the United States and Mexico were to ensure
"to the extent practicable" their environmental laws were enforced, but this
obligation was vague and never enforced. 5 Without a dispute resolution
process, and with vague provisions, the La Paz Agreement did not curb
pollution.52 In 1991, Presidents Bush and Salinas and Prime Minister
Mulroney had committed themselves to the creation of the NAFTA and
abandoned these prior agreements.53 Nevertheless, these prior agreements
indicate that environmental protection was a concern as early as 1889 for
the United States and Mexico.
2. United States and Canada
Past environmental agreements between the United States and Canada
have produced mixed results. First, in 1909 the Boundary Waters Treaty
was created to deal with the misuse and diversion of water along the United
States - Canadian border. 54 Under this treaty, the International Joint
Commission (hereinafter "IJC") was established to resolve disputes and it
still exists today.55 In the 1980's the United States and Canada entered into
the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, but it has not been successful in
47.
M. Grace Giorgio, Transboundary Pollution Disputes Under the North American
Free Trade Agreement, 3 S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 166, 178 (1994).

48. Id.
49. Idat 180.
50. Id.
51. Idat 182.
52. Id. at 178.
53. Gaines, supra note 6, at 430.
54. Giorgio, supra note 47, at 175.
55. Boundary Waters Treaty, opened for signature Jan. 11, 1909, Canada - United
States, The International Joint Commission and the Boundary Waters Treaty. Under Article IX,
the U.S. and Canada may submit a dispute to the UC regarding "questions or matters of
difference arising between them involving the rights, obligations, or interests of either in relation
to the other or to the inhabitants of the other, along the common frontier between the United
States and the Dominion of Canada" Id. at 10. A submission under Article IX only permits the
UC to examine and report on the facts of the matter along with the ability to provide
recommendations and conclusions. Id. These reports are not decisions. Under Article X, the
same disputes can be heard as in Article IX, but if parties submit a claim under Article X, the IJC
is able to reach a decision and if it cannot, the U.S. and Canada select an umpire to resolve the
matter. Id.
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resolving water pollution disputes, namely because the IJC lacks
enforcement power.5 6 In 1986 the United States and Canada entered into
the Hazardous Waste Agreement in order to control the transportation of
waste. Similar to the La Paz agreement, each country was to enforce its
own environmental laws "to the extent possible." Unfortunately, there
were no enforcement procedures in place for failure to meet this
obligation. 7 The only remedy for injury under this agreement was an
insurance policy in which each member was required to insure waste was
being transported across the border. 8 The Air Quality Agreement was
created in 1991 and has been very successful because it encourages
settlements through alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") and promotes
transparency of environmental laws, goals and techniques for
environmental regulation.59
As mentioned above, political leaders in the early 1990's did not
support environmental protection and shifted their attention to the NAFTA.
Nevertheless, the environmental agreements between the United States and
Canada, along with others, have strengthened relationships between the
United States and Canada. The Air Quality Agreement is an example of
how international environmental protection can be achieved through
cooperation.
D. Reasonsfor the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation
In 1993, the United States, Mexico, and Canada signed the NAAEC,
to promote cooperation and to oblige each member country to enforce its

56.

Giorgio, supra note 47, at 176.

57.

Id. at 177.

58.

Id.

59.

Air Quality Agreement, supra note 15, art. IV, VI, VII, XI & XIII, T.I.A.S. No.

11783, at 2-5; The purpose of the Air Quality Agreement is "to address shared concerns regarding
transboundary air pollution." Both countries expressed the belief that a healthy environment is
necessary "to assure the well-being of present and future generations." Id. at 1-2; Both parties
developed specific objectives stated in the annexes and each party has the responsibility to develop
programs and to take the necessary measures to meet those objectives. Id.; If one party does not
agree with the other's proposals the dispute is resolved through consultations. Further, if one
country plans to engage in an activity likely to cause pollution, it must consult the other country.
Id. at 2-3; The parties are to do research to learn about transboundary pollution and how to

control it, and they must share this information with the other party.

Id. at 3; In dispute

resolution, the parties are to enter consultations and if no result is reached, to use negotiations.

Id. at 5; If that does not work, the parties are to submit the matter to the UC for either
examination or decision see Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 55, at 10, or the parties may
agree on ADR. Id. at 5.
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environmental laws.'
The NAAEC was created as a result of the
tremendous pollution caused by the maquiladoraplants in the border area.
In the early 1990's, local residents and environmental advocates
pressured the NAFTA governments to create legal provisions and an
administrative mechanism that would integrate environmental protection
into the NAFTA. 6" These groups wanted a system that would create
obligations and commitments to the preservation of the environment.'
Overall, people wanted political leaders to take environmental protection
seriously because they were being injured and had no power to protect
themselves.
The NAAEC was also created to fill in the gaps of the NAFTA
environmental provisions, such as Chapter Eleven, and to provide a
balance between trade and environmental preservation.'
Mexico's
conspicuous absence of environmental law enforcement permitted low cost
production and the NAFTA's polluter pay principle was not enforced."
Under the NAAEC, each member must establish high levels of
environmental protection and enforce its laws.' Overall, the NAAEC was
created to promote cooperation between the three member countries and
effectuate environmental protection.
III. THE NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON ENVIRONMENTAL
COOPERATION AND ITS DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS
A.

Motivations & Obligations
The NAAEC's objectives center on the general goals of environmental
protection, cooperation, public participation, balancing economic growth
with environmental protection, and promoting the enforcement of
environmental laws.'
Other important aspects of the NAAEC are that
60. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 1, 32 I.L.M. at 1483; In 1993, the United States and
Mexico created the Border Environment Cooperation Commission ("BECC") and the North
American Development Bank ("NADB"). The BECC directs and certifies environmental
protection projects while the NADB funds BECC approved projects. Federal, state and local
governments plus the private sector provide additional funding. Agreement Between the
Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Mexican States
Concerning the Establishment of a Border Environment Cooperation Commission and a North
American Development Bank, Jan. 1, 1994, Mex. - U.S., St. Dep't. No. 94-28; Rowe, supra
note 4, at 213-14.
61.
Gaines, supra note 6, at 432.
62. Id.
63. Bivona, supra note 14, at 161.
64. Id. at 163.
65. Id. at 164; NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 3, 32 I.L.M., at 1483.
66. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 1, 32 I.L.M., at 1483; NAAEC articulates ten major
objectives:
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each member must prepare reports on the state of its environment, publish
all environmental laws, and provide citizens with access to judicial or
administrative proceedings when a citizen has a legally recognized
interest.' Regarding interpretation of the NAAEC, the member countries
are to come to a mutual understanding on the agreement's meaning, and
settle any interpretation concerns through cooperation and consultations.'

In addition, each party is to notify any other party if the first party believes
its actions may affect the operation of this agreement or significantly affect
the other party's interests.'
These provisions promote accountability,
environmental protection, transparency and public awareness.

B.

The Commission

The NAAEC's dispute resolution institution is the Commission on
Environmental Cooperation (hereinafter "CEC"). The CEC does not settle
a wide range of disputes but only determines whether there has been a

persistent pattern of failure by a party to effectively enforce its
environmental laws. 70 Therefore, this process does not provide a private
right of action.7 1 The CEC consists of a Council, Secretariat, Joint Public
Advisory Committee (hereinafter "JPAC") and other committees.72 Each
actor has a distinct function within the NAAEC.

1) foster the protection and improvement of the environment in the territories of the
parties for the well-being of the present and future generations;
2) promote sustainable development based on cooperation and mutually supportive
environmental and economic policies;
3) increase cooperation between the parties to better conserve, protect, and enhance
the environment, including wild flora and fauna;
4) support the environmental goals and objectives of the NAFTA;
5) avoid creating trade distortions or new trade barriers;
6) strengthen cooperation on the development and improvement of environmental
laws, regulations, procedures, policies and practices;
7) enhance compliance with, and enforcement of, environmental laws and regulations;
8) promote transparency and public participation in the development of environmental
laws, regulations and policies;
9) promote economically efficient and effective environmental measures; and
10) promote pollution prevention policies and practices.
Id.
NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 4-6, 32 I.L.M. at 1483-84.
68. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 20, 32 I.L.M. at 1489.
69. Id. at 1489-90.
70. J. Owen Saunders, NAFTA and the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation:A Model for International Collaborationon Trade and the Environment, 5 CoLO. J.
67.

INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 273, 298 (1994).

71.
72.

Giorgio, supra note 47, at 191.
NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 8, 32 I.L.M. at 1484.
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1. Council
The Council, as the governing body of the CEC, consists of cabinet
level representatives from each member country and oversees the
Secretariat.7 3 The Council is able to delegate authority and obtain
information from experts, private individuals and non-governmental
organizations ("NGOs").7 4 The Council provides a forum in which to
resolve environmental matters related to the NAAEC and makes
recommendations regarding the environment and pollution-prevention
techniques. 7' The Council encourages cooperation between the members
and helps each member improve its environmental laws by promoting the
exchange of information regarding methods used to establish or enforce
environmental standards. 6 The Council must also assist the NAFTA Free
Trade Commission ("FTC") in achieving the environmental goals in the
NAFTA.77 The Council has the duty to make recommendations regarding
the potential for cross-border suits by injured persons. However, Council
recommendations are not binding.78
The Council convenes a panel to resolve disputes when they occur.
The Council created a roster of persons willing to be panelists that it keeps
undated. 79 Roster member must have experience in environmental law, its
enforcement in the resolution of disputes under international agreements or
other relevant experience or expertise.' Each roster member must comply
with the Council's code of conduct and if a party believes a panelist to be
in violation of the code, the parties shall consult. If all parties agree, the
panelist will be removed and a new panelist will be selected."1
In the panelist selection process, the parties agree on a chair within
fifteen days after the Council votes to convene a panel.82 If the parties
cannot agree on a chair, the party chosen by lot must pick a chair within
five days.83 Within fifteen days after that chair is selected, the parties are
to choose two panelists who are citizens of the opposing party's country.84
If a party cannot make a choice, the panelists will be chosen by lot.
73. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 9 &10, 32 I.L.M. at 1485.
74. Id.
75. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 10, 32 I.L.M. at 1485-86.
76. Id.at 1486.
77. Id.
78. Id.at 1487.
79. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 25, 32 I.L.M. at 1491.
80. Id.
81.
NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 25, 27, 32 I.L.M. at 1491
82. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 27, 32 I.L.M. at 1491.
83. Id.
84. Id.; Ifthere are three disputing parties, the panel shall still contain five members and
all three parties need to chose a chair within fifteen days after the Council agrees to convene the
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When a panelist is chosen who is not on the roster, any party may use a
preemptory challenge to remove that panelist."
2. Secretariat
The Secretariat is headed by an Executive Director who is chosen by
the Council for a three-Iear term. This position rotates among members of
each member country.e The Executive Director appoints a staff procured
from a list prepared by the member countries and the JPAC. The Council
can reject any appointment by a two-thirds vote.87
The Secretariat has a variety of functions. It provides technical,
administrative and operational support to the Council, submits the annual
program and budget for Council approval, and prepares an annual report
that is released to the public after Council review.8 8 This report may
include information about actions taken by each member country in
connection with its obligations under the NAAEC or data regarding each
member's environmental law enforcement.89 The Secretariat receives
submissions from private persons or NGOs asserting that a member
country has failed to effectively enforce its environmental laws." The
Secretariat may request a response from the other party involved if the
claim is well founded, but if the matter is pending in another court or
administrative proceeding, the Secretariat will not honor the claim.9 Each
claim must:
a) be in writing;
b) clearly identify the person or organization making the
submission;
c) provide sufficient information to allow the Secretariat review
the claim;
d) promote and not harass industry;
panel. If the parties cannot agree on a chair, the party or parties chosen by lot shall choose a
chair within ten days. Within thirty days after selection of the chair, the party complained against
shall choose two panelists, one from each of the complaining parties. The complaining countries
select two panelists who are citizens of the party complained against. If any party does not pick a
panelist, the panelist will be chosen by lot based on the citizenship requirements stated above. Id.
85.

Id.

86.

NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 11, 32 I.L.M. at 1487.

87.

Id.

88.
89.
90.

NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 11, 12, 32 I.L.M. at 1488.
NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 12, 32 I.L.M. at 1488.
NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 14, 32 I.L.M. at 1488.

91.

Id.
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e) indicate that the matter has been communicated in writing to
the relevant authorities of the party and indicate the party's
response; 92 and
f) be filed by a person or organization residing or established in
the territory of a party. 93 If the submission warrants the making
of a factual record, the Secretariat notifies the Council and
provides reasons. 94 A two-thirds Council vote is needed to make
a factual record and another vote is required to make the factual
record public. 9

The Secretariat may be equated to that of an Administrative Manager'
because it collects all claims and undertakes the initial investigation to
determine if the claims are worthwhile. The Council then votes on the
Secretariat's determination of whether to publish these factual records and
annual reports. These procedures make the dispute resolution process
more efficient because the Council vote is a check on the Secretariat's

determinations, ensuring the Secretariat acts in an acceptable manner. In
preparing the factual record, the Secretariat will obtain information from
the submitting parties, the JPAC, independent experts, information it has
discovered and publicly available information.' The Secretariat, however,

has no authority to review a party's failure to enforce its environmental
laws.9"

3. Committees
The JPAC is made up of fifteen representatives, five from each

member country.'

The JPAC provides technical and scientific information

92. This is how a member country becomes involved in the suit. The NAAEC is not
clear on whether approval is needed or if notice to the member country is sufficient.
93. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 14, 32 I.L.M. at 1488; When the Secretariat determines
that a submission meets the filing requirements, it must determine whether the submission merits a
response from the complained against party. The Secretariat considers:
1) if the submission alleges harm to the person or organization making the claim;
2) if the submission raises issues whose further study would advance the goals of the
NAAEC;
3) if private remedies have been pursued under the party's laws; and
4) if the submission is based solely on media reports.
Id.
94. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 15, at 1488-89.
95. Id.
96. Often called a preparatory judge, case manger, civil prosecutor or judge de misc.
97. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 15, at 1488-89.
98. Grant, supra note 36, at 449.
99. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 16, at 1489.
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to the Secretariat and advice to the Council."t ' Each country may convene
a national advisory committee made up of members of the public and/or
governmental advisory committees made up of federal and state
representatives to advise on the implementation and possible alterations to
the NAAEC.0 1
C. Assessment of the CEC & Actors
The CEC employs a coordinate structure in which each actor has
separate functions, subject to checks on these functions. The Council is
involved in dispute resolution, recommendations promoting cooperation,
and helping the member countries create highly protective environmental
laws. The Secretariat investigates claims, creates factual records and
prepares other reports. All these actions performed by the Secretariat are
subject to Council review. The JPAC and other committees provide
services only when called upon by the Council or Secretariat.
The CEC also has a vertical or hierarchical structure. The Council is
the governing body and the Secretariat, and other committee functions, are
subject to Council oversight. The JPAC, subject to the orders of the
Secretariat and Council, is an information-providing source for the two
bodies, while the other national advisory committees are under the control
of each member country. In many ways this system shares characteristics
with the structure of the United States government in that each actor has
defined roles, similar to the separation of powers concept. Each actor in
the CEC is subject to a check or oversight, similar to the United States
checks and balances system. However, the Council is the one body in the
CEC whose actions do not appear to be subject to any checks.
Except for the selection process and criteria requirements for
panelists, the NAAEC is extremely vague regarding the selection of
Council members as well as the number appointed. It also does not
mention how many Secretariat staff persons are appointed or if an equal
number is selected from each member country. These vague provisions
create difficulty in interpreting the NAAEC.
The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (hereinafter
"Labor Side Agreement") provides greater detailed descriptions of these
selection procedures.' °" For example, the CLC Council is made up of
labor ministers from each member country.' 0 3 There should be a
requirement under the NAAEC that members of the CEC Council have
100. Id.
101. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 17, 18, at 1489.
102. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, opened for signature Sept. 9,
1993, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 1499; The Labor Side Agreement created a Commission for
Labor Cooperation ("CLC") containing a Council and Secretariat assisted by the National
Administrative Office ("NAO") of each party. Id. at art. 8, 32 I.L.M. at 1504.
103. The Labor Side Agreement, supra note 102, art. 9, 32 I.L.M. at 1505.
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environmental law experience or require that the Council be composed of
environmental ministers. These specialized representatives could provide
guidance and possibly better dispute resolution skills, than a representative
without environmental experience. The CLC Executive Director selects its
Secretariat staff while taking into consideration "the importance of
recruiting an equitable proportion of the professional staff from among the
nationals of each party." 1" Also, the Council is made up of fifteen staff
members.
The Council can change this number if they deem it
necessary. 105
These detailed selection provisions in the Labor Side Agreement may
be due to the fact that labor issues involve human rights. When dealing
with human rights issues, further protections are usually taken to avoid
violating an individual's rights. Adding these detailed descriptions of the
selection process of CEC intervenors would serve to clarify the NAAEC,
provide skilled decision-makers and avoid interpretation disputes.
The NAAEC does contain evaluation criteria. For example, the
Council may remove the Executive Director for cause, each panelist must
abide to a code of conduct and the filing party must meet certain initial
requirements to file, and the Secretariat's actions are subject to Council
oversight."°( These measures would appear to effectively check the actions
of Council members. However, the Council's power, in practice, appears
to be unfettered.
A check should be placed on the Council's authority, such as removal
of the two-thirds vote to deny a claim and the publishing of a factual
report. An apt replacement would be a frivolous claim standard that the
Council must apply accompanied by a requirement to provide reasons for
why a claim should be denied." ° There is little reason not to prepare a
factual record because the Secretariat has already done most of the research
and publishing the factual record promotes transparency and public
awareness."o If the Council denies a claim then decides not to publish the
factual record, a suspicion of cover-up will flourish that will undermine the
credibility of the CEC.' °9 Therefore, the Council's two-thirds veto power
should be restricted.
This power limitation would promote public
awareness and participation, create an incentive for enforcement of
domestic environmental laws and protect CEC credibility.
104. The Labor Side Agreement, supra note 102, art. 12, 32 I.L.M. at 1506.
105. Id.

106. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 10, 11, 14, 25, 32 I.L.M. at 1485, 1487, 1488, 1491.
107. See infra pp. 34-35 for a further discussion of this concern.
108. David S. Baron, NAFTA and the Environment: Making the Side Agreement Work, 12
ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 603, 611 (1995); NAAEC does take into account confidential
information and will not make such information public. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 39, 32
I.L.M. at 1494.

109. Id.
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The Council gathers technical data, develops recommendations, and
encourages members to incorporate these recommendations into their laws
and policies. These actions have some political impact because they
encourage a member to alter its present laws and may infringe on a
member's sovereignty. However, because these Council recommendations
are not binding, they have little influence.
To make these
recommendations binding would give the Council too much power and
usurp the control of the member countries over their domestic
environmental laws, a power retained by the members under the
NAAEC." 0
In order to make this Council function more effective, the member
countries should have the right to vote on adopting a recommendation.
This procedure would promote cooperation because if a recommendation is
approved, the laws of the members will become more unified. Therefore,
although the Council has too much power in some areas, such as denying
submissions and the publishing of factual records, it seems illogical to give
the Council the power and resources to conduct research and make
recommendations if these recommendations have little weight. This is a
waste of resources. Council research and recommendations are very
important because they promote cooperation through the potential for
unification of law. Therefore, giving each member the right to vote upon
each recommendation would substantiate this function of the Council and
give the Council a quasi-legislative role. It would also be advantageous to
let Council members initiate legislation and vote on policy. In addition, the
members have their own research and environmental regulation
procedures, which may be attractive to other members. This sharing of
ideas can lead to additional cooperation between nations, and assist less
advanced nations by enhancing technology ideas and information.
D.

The CECDispute Resolution Process
Once the Secretariat accepts a submission, any party may request a
consultation with any other concerned party, whether or not there has been
a persistent pattern of failure by the other party to effectively enforce its
environmental laws.111 The request must be in writing and submitted to the
Secretariat and the other party."' A third party may participate in the
consultations if it believes that it has a significant interest in the matter.',"
The parties are expected to take every measure in order to reach a
resolution, but if no result is reached within sixty days, any party may
request a Council session."' The Council is to convene within twenty days
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 3, 32 I.L.M. 1483.
NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 22, 32 I.L.M. at 1490.
Id.
Id.
NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 22, 23, 32 I.L.M. at 1490.
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of receiving the request, and may utilize the assistance of technical
advisers, experts or other groups."
To assist the parties in reaching a
mutually satisfactory agreement, the Council may use conciliation and
mediation or make a recommendation. "' These procedures involve the use
of a neutral party to help the disputing parties reach a settlement. A
Council recommendation will be made public if approved by a two-thirds
Council vote." 7
If the dispute has not been settled within sixty days, the Council, by
written party request, shall convene an arbitrary panel to decide whether
there has been a persistent pattern of failure by a party to effectively
enforce its environmental laws." 8 The panel bases its determination on the
submissions and arguments of each party, and the information presented by
experts. 19 Within 180 days, the panel must present an initial report to the
parties containing findings of fact, a determination of whether or not a
persistent pattern of failure to effectively enforce environmental law has
occurred, and its recommendations for the resolution of the dispute. "2 Any
party may submit written comments to the panel and after considering these
121
comments, the panel will present a final report, which will be published.
If the panel decision is in the affirmative, the parties may mutually agree
on an action plan, which must conform to the panel decision and must be
presented to the Council and Secretariat.22
Under certain conditions, the panel may reconvene. If the parties, (a)
cannot agree on the action plan or (b) cannot agree on whether or not the
defending party has fully implemented an action plan chosen by the parties
or an action plan created by the panel, any party may request the panel to
reconvene."' If the panel is reconvened under (a), it will determine
whether an action plan proposed by the defending party is sufficient and if
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 24, 32 I.L.M. at 1490; A panel will only decide this
issue if the matter involves "workplaces, firms, companies or sectors that produce goods or
provide services: (a) traded between the territories of the parties; or (b) that compete, in the
territory of the party complained against, with goods or services produced or provided by persons
of another party." Id. Therefore, it must be a trade-related issue.
119. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 28-30, 32 I.L.M. at 1492; The Council is to establish
rules of procedure that provide a right to at least one hearing before the panel and the chance to
make written submissions. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 28, 32 I.L.M. at 1491.
120. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 31, 32 I.L.M. at 1492; The punishment is an action
plan requiring the losing party to correct its non-enforcement. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 33, 32
I.L.M. at 1492.
121. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 31, 32, 32 I.L.M. at 1492.
122. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 33, 32 I.L.M. at 1492.
123. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 34, 32 I.L.M. at 1492.
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so, it will approve the plan.' 24 On the other hand, if the plan is not
permissible, the panel will establish an action plan."~ The panel may also
impose monetary sanctions. 26
If the panel is reconvened under (b), the panel is to determine if the
offending party has fully implemented the action plan and if that party has
not done so the panel is to impose monetary sanctions. 127 The money from
these sanctions is used to improve environmental law enforcement in the
offending country." A party may again convene a panel to determine if
the opposing party has fully implemented the action plan.129 If a party fails
to pay a monetary sanction, the complaining party may suspend that party's
NAFTA benefits. 30 The sanctioned party may submit a written request
that the Council reconvenes the panel to determine whether the suspension
of benefits is excessive.1
132
These enforcement procedures are subject to Annex 34 and 36A.
Annex 34 states that a monetary sanction cannot exceed .007 percent of the
total trade in goods between the parties during the most recent year for
which such data is obtainable.13 Annex 36A states that if a panel
determines that Canada shall pay a sanction or fully implement an action
plan, the CEC will file the panel determination with a Canadian court with
competent jurisdiction and such panel determination will become a court
order. 134 This panel determination is35 binding on the court and it is not
subject to domestic review or appeal.
E. Assessment of the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation
This discussion will begin with an analysis of the vagueness 136 within
certain NAAEC provisions regarding compulsory/non-compulsory

124. Id. at 1493.
125.

Id.

126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Stanton, supra note 4, at 76.
129. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 35, 32 I.L.M. at 1493.
130. Id. at 1494.
131.

Id.

132. NAAEC, supra note 12, annex 34, 32 I.L.M. at 1496; Annex 36B also places limits
on the suspension of NAFTA benefits; NAAEC, supra note 12, Annex 36B, 32 I.L.M. at 1497.
133

Id.

134. NAAEC, supra note 12, annex 36A, 32 I.L.M. at 1497.
135. Id.
136. Although most international agreements do contain vague language, in order to form
an agreement that all parties will support, this language often creates disputes regarding

19981

Weiss

jurisdiction, interpretation consultations, and the phrase "high levels." The
discussion will then shift to the actual dispute resolution process. First,
entry or access to the process will be discussed. This will include: the
party who submits the claim, who is involved in the suit, the issue decided,
and Council oversight. Second, party control, as a theme throughout the
entire process, will be analyzed, including the concepts of consensual
resolution and time restrictions for settlement. Third, the methodology of
the decision-making will be discussed, focusing on how decisions are made
and what is taken into consideration. Finally, the discussion will look at
the outcome, whether it is binding or non-binding, the enforcement of the
outcome and other related concerns.
1. Vagueness
The NAAEC does not specifically state if consent to jurisdiction is
compulsory or non-compulsory. In Article 22, after a party makes a
request for consultations to another party, there is no mention of whether
or not the requested party can deny the request. 37 This could be a problem
because parties may take vastly differing views on if and when consent is
needed. If the requested party is required to comply, that party is now
subject to the entire CEC dispute resolution process and possibly a binding
panel decision. If the party is able to deny the request the goal of
cooperation among member countries would be frustrated, which would
constitute avoidance which would be detrimental to the success of this
agreement and the members' relations.
Although non-compulsory
jurisdiction may have been the intent of the NAAEC's drafters, compulsory
jurisdiction is practiced because of pressure from member countries.
Compulsory jurisdiction is the best method for the NAAEC because it
forces the parties to meet and resolve their problems. The fact that a
binding panel decision may lie ahead is an incentive to reach a mutually
satisfactory decision as soon as possible. This provision needs to be
clarified in order to prevent future conflicts. Also, this change could be
made in the short-term because it would not change the nature of the
NAAEC but rather align the interpretations of the member countries. The
NAAEC fails to provide procedures for consultations when an
interpretation dispute arises. The NAAEC does not mention where the
parties are to meet; which issues are to be discussed; and how long the
parties have to resolve the matter through consultations. Also, the NAAEC
does not provide further procedures in the event a result cannot be reached
through consultations. When the members disagree on the NAAEC's
interpretation the parties must use "cooperation and consultations to resolve

interpretation. NAAEC contains several provisions with vague language creating difficulty in
determining precisely how the dispute resolution process operations.
137.

NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 22, 32 I.L.M. at 1490.
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any matter that might affect its operation. "138 This provision provides little
guidance.
The Labor Side Agreement, provides explicit procedures regarding
disputes over interpretation. 139
A National Administrative Office
(hereinafter "NAO"), which serves as a contact point for each member and
the Secretariat, may request consultations with another NAO. Any party
may request, in writing, consultations with another party regarding any
matter within the scope of the Labor Side Agreement.1" If the matter is
not resolved through consultations, a party may request the establishment
of an Evaluation Committee of Experts (hereinafter "ECE"). The ECE is
selected in a manner similar to the CEC panel, which will create a draft
report to which the parties can submit comments and then publish a final
report.'
The Council is able to keep the matter under review. 4 2 These
procedures provide a framework and promote cooperation, unlike the
confusion the NAAEC provides. Specific procedures, like those in the
Labor Side Agreement, could be added to the NAAEC in the short-term.
These procedures would be a positive addition because they would reduce
or eliminate interpretation disputes and promote cooperation through
consultations.
Another vague provision in the NAAEC is the obligation that each
member country must create environmental laws, which provide high levels
of environmental protection. "43 The meaning of high levels in the United
States differs from its meaning in Mexico. Each member has a different
view of what the definition of high levels of environmental protection is.
In addition, the NAAEC does not provide a check to make sure that each
member's laws meet this standard. Overall, this provision has little weight
because of its vagueness and lack of enforcement.
After the NAAEC becomes more influential, it would be beneficial to
establish specific environmental standards that apply to all members.
Specific standards would give this provision a purpose while creating a
basis of measurement to determine whether or not each party has met the
standard.
This reform would change the CEC's threshold issue of
determining whether the standards have been met instead of whether each
member has enforced its own laws. However, domestic law should still
cover the methods used to obtain these standards. This would be a longterm goal since the NAAEC is new and such a drastic change would limit
sovereignty.

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 20, 32 1.L.M. at 1489.
The Labor Side Agreement, supra note 102, art. 20-26, 32 I.L.M. at 1507-09.
The Labor Side Agreement, supra note 102, art. 21, 22, 32 I.L.M. at 1507-08.
The Labor Side Agreement, supra note 102, art. 23, 32 I.L.M. at 1508.
The Labor Side Agreement, supra note 102, art. 26, 32 I.L.M. at 1509.
NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 3, 32 I.L.M. at 1483.
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Overall, an international agreement with gaps or vague language
causes disputes and could impair cooperation.
However, too much
specificity could be detrimental and impede approval. Except for the third
one, the aforementioned measures do not significantly alter the agreement,
and would only improve interpretation and compliance.
2. The Process
Access into the process has several positive and negative features. It
is easy for a private individual or an NGO to submit a claim and to have
the Secretariat make a factual record, so long as it meets the requirements
stated earlier.'" These requirements are read liberally in order to ensure
that the process provides much public participation, a goal of the
NAAEC.' 5
On the downside, the parties making the submissions are not the
parties to the suit; rather the member countries are the parties to the suit.'"6
Therefore, it seems as though private individuals and NGOs would be
discouraged from making a claim since they cannot recover damages
through this system. However, since the CEC is the only institution
providing an environmental dispute resolution process regarding the
border, private individuals and NGOs are more likely to submit claims in
order to make their member country aware of another member's failure to
enforce its laws.
Another concern limiting access is that the CEC dispute resolution
process only resolves one issue. That issue is whether or not a party has
shown a persistent pattern of failure to effectively enforce its environmental
laws.' 47 This is a difficult issue to prove because it may require technical
information that an individual or NGO does not have access too. Also, the
determination of this question is based upon how the actors involved in the
dispute resolution process perceive what does and what does not constitute
a persistent pattern of failure to enforce environmental laws. Therefore, a
subjective method is used which may prohibit impartial decision-making. 4
In addition, limiting access to one issue, denies injured individuals
with valid claims against a polluting party, access to an international
environmental dispute resolution process. Mexico does not allow citizens
to bring private actions to demand enforcement of environmental laws.
Therefore, the NAAEC requirement that each member provide a right of
action for citizens with a "legally recognized interest", would not apply to
Mexican citizens who were injured. 49
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 14, 32 I.L.M. at 1488.
Baron, supra note 108, at 608.
Id.; see supra note 144.
NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 22, 32 I.L.M. at 1490.
See infra pp. 37-39 for a further discussion of this issue.
Silverman, supra note 22, at 357; NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 6, 32 I.L.M. at 1484.
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Supporters of cross-border suits believe that although suits may be
filed across borders today, government corruption severely restricts the use
of this option. 0 Thus, cross-border suits under the NAAEC would
provide injured persons with a means by which to seek remedy against the
government, and to participate in the movement toward environmental
protection and accountability.
The Nordic Convention of 1974 between Denmark, Finland, Norway,
and Sweden is an environmental agreement that allows cross-border
suits."' Any person affected by environmentally harmful activities in
another contracting state has the right to bring a claim to the appropriate
court or administrative authority regarding the permissibility of such
activities." 2 An individual may appeal the decision and has the same legal
rights as a person of that country in which the harmful activities are taking
place. 'a One critic of the NAAEC believes that cross-border suits need to
be added to the NAAEC because there is no private right of action." 4
Also, since the United States is very skilled at environmental litigation,
United States citizens and organizations could effectively sue in Mexican
courts and receive the remedies due. 5 5 However, critics suggest that
cross-border suits would infringe upon each member country's
sovereignty. 5 6 Mexico holds sovereignty in high regard and would likely
In
withdraw from the NAAEC if cross-border suits were established.'
addition, this change would force member countries to alter their standing
laws giving up more sovereignty.5' The United States and Canada are
very experienced in environmental litigation and cross border suits would
result in a flooding of Mexican courts which would be grossly unfair to
Mexico and would frustrate cooperation. 5 9 Additionally, it has been
argued that since the present CEC does not permit private individuals to
directly sue polluting, factories for damages, there is a diluted impact on
the actual polluters, since the member country of the polluter is the one
who is punished."° While this argument is very persuasive, the NAAEC is
150. "Any member country is free to place burdensome restrictions to recognizing a right
of action for citizen or non-citizen suits." Stanton, supra note 4, at 79; "Ensuring a right of
action to citizens would not be enough on its own if citizens fear that corruption of the system
may put their lives or liberty in danger by exercising that right". Id.
151. The Nordic Convention, supra note 15, art. 3, 13 I.L.M. at 592.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Stanton, supra note 4, at 76.
155. Id.
156. Grant, supra note 36, at 452.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 454.
159. Id. at 455.
160. Id.
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not prepared for cross-border suits. However, such a process may be
desirable in the future.
Cross-border suits would require substantial change in a limited
time. 6 ' It would limit sovereignty and force member countries to change
their domestic laws. The member countries would not be willing to give
up this much control so soon after the NAAEC's adoption. Before making
a large revision to the NAAEC, the member countries would want to
analyze the NAAEC's impact and success in its original form. After the
NAAEC establishes itself, problems will be easier to locate and such a
reform, as a cross-border suit, may be implemented.
Another measure, such as the creation of a commission to oversee
suits, could be implemented to provide injured individuals with a right of
action against polluters. The NAAEC could support a commission to deal
solely with private individual and organization claims against polluters.
This commission, containing representatives from each member country,
would use ADR to give the parties a chance to resolve their issues. If a
result cannot be reached, the court could then hold a trial type hearing and
reach a dichotomous decision. It is important not only to punish the
member county for not enforcing its laws, but also to punish the polluter
for ignoring the laws and injuring innocent people.
Another potential solution is to allow the CEC to settle private
disputes, thus increasing the number of issues the CEC can resolve.
However, this solution has several weak points. First, if the CEC resolved
public and private international disputes it would be burdened with a huge
caseload. Second, this suggestion would involve restructuring the CEC
and its dispute resolution process. Third, this procedure would give the
CEC too much power. Therefore, creating a new commission for private
suits would make more sense. It would be comparable to the United States
Tax Court in that it would be a specialized court only hearing cases related
to private and organization disputes, just as the Tax Court only hears tax
related cases.
A third possible reform would be to allow the United States and
Canadian citizens and organizations, experienced in environmental
litigation, to file suits against United States plants in the border area.
Thus, eventually full cross border suits could be enacted. Although this
process sounds good, it is discriminatory since United States plants would
be subject to pay damages when Japanese or Mexican plants located near
the United States plants are able to pollute. In addition, since pollution
knows no boundaries, the pollution from another factory could make its
way to a United States plant's section of the river, soil or air, making that
United States plant liable for the pollution from other plants. United States
161. Even though the Council has the authority to make recommendations to the member
countries about cross border suits, these recommendations are not binding and nothing in my
research suggests that cross border suits are being considered at this time. NAAEC, supra note

12, art. 10, 32 I.L.M. at 1487.
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plants would have to pay higher production costs and this would clearly
interfere with free trade under the NAFTA. This system would not be
successful and would not promote cooperation.
Unlike the European Union (hereinafter "EU"), the United States,62
Mexico, and Canada do not want to become entirely interdependent.'
They cherish their sovereignty while supporting cooperation through the
NAFTA and the NAAEC. Therefore, a commission solely for private suits
would be the best solution since a forum is needed for individuals injured
by pollution are able to seek redress from the polluters.
Another aspect of the CEC that denies access is the Council's power
to deny a claim even if the Secretariat believes that the claim meets the
stated requirements and merits a factual record. The Council can deny this
action by a two-thirds vote, and can also deny making a factual record
public by a two-thirds vote. 163 This Council power is too great and
impedes the NAAEC goal of public participation. If a claim is based on
incorrect information and is unfounded it should not be considered.
However, if the Secretariat expends the time and money to investigate a
claim and provides good reasons for making and publishing a factual
record, the Council should approve the submission. Therefore, a frivolous
claim standard, similar to the United States rules of summary judgment or
failure to state a claim should be adopted. This would promote public
participation, continue to put a check on the Secretariat along with
restricting the Council's vast authority to deny claims, even when the
Secretariat fully believes the claim is well supported. Publishing the
factual record would provide parties with an incentive to enforce their laws
and would also promote public awareness.
3. Party Control
162. The EU was created in 1957 under the Treaty of Rome with the purpose of creating a
unified economy and environmental issues were not considered an economic concern at this time.
Robbins, supra note 24, at 144-45; In 1987, the Single European Act [hereinafter "SEA"], Title
VII, often called the Environmental Title, gave the EU the express power to consider
environmental protection as an essential factor in all economic and social policy-making. Id.;
The SEA established the following objective: "to preserve, protect and improve the quality of the
environment, to contribute towards protecting human health and to ensure prudent and rational
utilization of natural resources."

WILLIAM RAWLINSON, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW: A

PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 263 (2d. ed. 1994); The EU Court of Justice has jurisdiction over a wide
range of issues and has recognized environmental protection as an EU objective since 1985.
Zacker, supra note 14, at 264; Therefore, if an EU member violates EU environmental law, the
Court of Justice will punish that member. EU members are able to create their own
environmental laws, but EU law supersedes member law with a few exceptions. Symposium, The
European Community in 1992: An IntegratedApproach to Economy and Ecology, 1990 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 1759, 1779 (1990). EU members have a desire to be unified economically and in other
ways, but the NAFTA and the NAAEC members do not want such interdependence.
163. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 15, 32 I.L.M. at 1488-89.
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The CEC process provides the parties to the dispute with much control
over how the dispute will be resolved." The parties initiate the procedures
by requesting a council or panel session, or by reconvening a panel after a
panel decision is made.' 1 This procedure gives the parties control over the
resolution of their dispute and promotes cooperation because it would be in
the parties' best interests to reach a resolution before they go to a panel and
have the matter decided for them. Party control also exists in the selection
of the intervenor because the parties appoint cabinet level officials from
their respective countries to serve on the Council and also select the
panelists. '6
Party control extends into the Council session. The Council may use
a variety of procedures to settle the dispute and may also make
recommendations to assist the disputing parties in reaching a mutually
satisfactory resolution.' 67 However, prior to being subject to a Council
decision, the parties have a chance to reach a resolution in a nonadversarial way, thus avoiding a dichotomous decision and promoting
cooperation.'6' The parties must weigh the costs and benefits of resolving
the dispute through the CEC and may choose ADR outside the CEC. In
the future, the parties may be able to resolve some disputes through cross
border suits. The Council has the duty of making recommendations to the
member countries regarding the possible implementation of such

164. Party control is a theme found in NAFTA and the Air Quality Agreement.
165. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 23-24, 35, 32 I.L.M. at 1490-91, 1493.
166. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 9, 27, 32 I.L.M. at 1484, 1491.
167. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 23, 32 I.L.M. at 1490.
168. "Cooperative resolution of disputes by the parties themselves is a laudable goal, and
the Agreement provides ample opportunity to pursue that end." Baron, supra note 145, at 612;
The dispute resolution process of the Labor Side Agreement is almost identical to the CEC dispute
resolution process, thus promoting party resolution of disputes before being subject to a binding
determination. The Labor Side Agreement, supra note 141, art. 27-41, 32 I.L.M. at 1509-12;
The NAFTA dispute resolution process has the goal of enhancing relations between the parties and
a great commitment to reaching an agreement at the consultations stage rather then at the FTC or
panel stage. GILBERT R. WINHAM, AssEsSING NAFTA: A TRINATIONAL ANALYSIS 256 (Steven

Globerman & Michael Walker eds., 1993); Article 2022 says that each party must encourage the
use of arbitration and other ADR and that each party should establish procedures to observe
agreements to arbitrate and to recognize and enforce arbitration decisions. The NAFTA, supra
note 12, art. 2022, 32 I. L. M. at 698; Therefore, the NAFTA process seems even more rigorous
in forcing members to resolve disputes on their own. The Air Quality Agreement also places
extreme emphasis on party resolution of disputes. The parties must go through consultations and
negotiations before they may submit their matter to the UC. The Air Quality Agreement, supra
note 11, art. XI, XIII, T.I.A.S. No. 11783 at 4-5; In addition, the parties are not bound to submit
matters to the UC and are encouraged to use ADR. Id. Therefore, it can be inferred that much of
the CEC dispute resolution process is taken from the NAFTA and the Air Quality Agreement.
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procedures with the possibility that such measures may be included in the
NAAEC in the future."
Another aspect of party control is the fact that the CEC dispute
resolution process limits the length of consultations and Council sessions to
sixty days. 70 This is a good safeguard to make sure the parties approach
ADR seriously and work rigorously to reach a result. The limitations
provide an incentive to reach a settlement quickly because the parties may
be subject to a binding panel decision which one or all parties may not find
advantageous.
Overall, as in NAFTA and other agreements, the CEC dispute
resolution process strongly promotes party control over the resolution of
disputes through the use of ADR. This process promotes cooperation and
provides the members with skills that will be useful in the future for
making additional changes or additions to the NAAEC and other
agreements..
Methodology of Decision
Since the NAAEC is a relatively new agreement, the CEC does not
have pre-existing law upon which to base its decisions. The CEC decisionmakers make determinations based on what they believe constitutes a
persistent pattern of failure to effectively enforce environmental laws.
With members from all three countries on the Council and panel, reaching
this conclusion may be difficult and result in inconsistent conclusions.
There is no prior law and the issue to be decided is a factual question.
Therefore, the method used in decision-making is a subjective test. Results
are based upon the interests and perceptions of the intervenors and not
upon a body of law. The interests of these intervenors should be to
promote environmental protection and to make sure each member country
enforces its laws. However, there is no check on the discretion of the
decision-makers, so other interests interfere with objective reasoning.
Since each member is represented on the Council and panel, the decision
seems fair because each party is equally represented, but the subjective test
prohibits impartiality.
NAAEC critics claim that the CEC should be composed of
government and non-governmental organizations, environmental and health
experts, environmental organization members, the public, interested local
and regional environmental, industrial, and development organizations in
A more inclusive
order to better serve the needs of the border areas.'
CEC would promote public and expert participation, community
"An increase in local
involvement and local bi-national cooperation."
F.

169.
170.
171.
172.

NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 10, 32 I.L.M. at 1487.
NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 23, 24, 32 I.L.M. at 1490.
Rowe, supra note 4, at 228.
Id.
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public participation should promote equitable consideration of maquiladora
community residents' needs, acknowledge both economic and social
considerations, and reduce environmental racism."" 7
Therefore, one
solution to biased decision-making may be to make the CEC more diverse.
In addition to diversifying the CEC, an objective test standard should be
created to be applied to each dispute. An objective test will reduce biased
decision-making by applying the same standard to each case. 74
The NAAEC does take into consideration Customary International
Environmental Law, which states that each country has the sovereign right
to control the use of resources within its boundaries unless or until such
activities harm an area outside the country's territory. 75
Bilateral
international agreements regarding the environment create broad principles
and domestic law is required to enforce these international principles. 7 6
The domestic law of each member country must provide high levels of
environmental protection in order to meet the objectives of the NAAEC.'7
G.

Outcome and Enforcement
The NAAEC provides extremely effective procedures for enforcing
panel determinations. The NAAEC is new and the United States, Mexico,
and Canada have never created an environmental commission like the
CEC. Therefore, decisions must be enforced in order to ensure the
NAAEC is complied with while giving the CEC respect and clout.
1. Binding
Panel decisions are binding due to the enforcement procedures that are
initiated by party request. 7 8 Under this new dispute resolution process,
Mexico can no longer use the excuse that it is too costly to enforce its
environmental laws. Under the NAAEC, it is too costly not to enforce
those laws because if a member has not fully implemented an action plan or
has not paid a sanction, the panel may suspend NAFTA benefits or institute
173.

Id.

174. The objective test may entail the following analysis: 1) the complained against
party's law enforcement practices since the NAAEC's enactment; 2) the extent of injuries to
private individuals and any organizations involved; and 3) an analysis of the severity of actual
land, water or air damage keeping in mind that a large amount of environmental damage may
result from one sudden and unexpected event. These three steps will be based on a reasonableness
standard similar to the U.S. system. Therefore, even if many of the Council representatives are
biased toward a party, they will have to provide reasons for why there is a persistent pattern of
failure to enforce environmental laws and cannot make a decision solely because of personal
beliefs.
175.

Giorgio, supra note 47, at 168.

176. Id. at 170. These broad international principles are called "soft law."
177.

NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 3, 32 I.L.M. at 1483.

178.

NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 34, 35, 32 I.L.M. at 1492-94.
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monetary sanctions.'7 These enforcement procedures provide an incentive
for a member country to enforce its laws and for disputing parties to
resolve the matter through ADR, consultations or Council sessions.
Overall, these procedures have a deterrence effect and are imperative for
the NAAEC's success.
2. Non-Binding
Alternatively, consultations and Council session determinations are
non-binding. The rational is that parties will be less likely to agree to
participate in these procedures if decisions are binding and rigidly
enforced."i ° If a resolution is reached through consultations, Council
session or ADR, the decision is not binding per se because it is mutually
agreed upon and assumed the parties will comply.
Nevertheless, some check should be imposed to make sure nonbinding decisions are followed. One possibility would be to require the
parties meet one year after the decision is reached to ensure the decision
has been complied with. If after one year the parties are satisfied with the
results of the decision, no further meetings are necessary. If there is noncompliance, the parties should be allowed to re-enter the CEC dispute
resolution process, use other ADR to reach a new solution, or decide how
to achieve the old solution. This would promote cooperation by forcing
compliance. If a party will not comply with the settlement, they are
frustrating the goals of the NAAEC and must be forced to, comply or else
asked to withdraw from the NAAEC.' 8 1 This additional procedure to
ensure that non-binding decisions are complied with would make the
NAAEC stronger, and indicate a true commitment by the parties to
environmental protection and cooperation.
3. Party Comments
Although the CEC process does not provide for appeals, the panel is
able to change its initial determination. After the panel makes an initial
report, the parties are able to submit written comments that the panel
considers in reaching its final determination.1 12 At this stage it is possible
for the panel to change its decision if a party comment points to an error in
the initial report. This procedure is good because it forces the panel to
review its prior determination and correct any inconsistencies. An appeals
179. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 34, 35, 32 I.L.M. at 1493 & 1494.
180. NAAEC provides further proceedings, that are party initiated, in which the panel
reconvenes to determine if the losing party has fully implemented the approved action plan, and if
not, that party will pay sanctions or have its NAFTA benefits suspended. NAAEC, supra note 12,
art. 34, 35, 32 I.L.M. at 1493-94.
181. Each member is able to withdraw from the NAAEC six months after submitting a
written notice of withdrawal to all members. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 50, 32 I.L.M. at 1495.
182. NAAEC, supra note 12, art. 31, 32, 32 I.L.M. at 1492.
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process would increase the CEC caseload and cause delay. Environmental
issues need quick determinations in order to avoid further pollution. This
two step procedure provides a review of the prior determination plus allows
for quick decision-making.' 83 The CEC enforcement procedures are
comliance aand make sure that each member
effective because they force
laws.
environmental
its
enforces
H. Justificationsfor Outcome
The final determination is based on evidence presented by the parties
to the proceedings, the parties who submitted the claim, experts, and the
Council and Secretariat. As mentioned above, the decision is not based on
a standard, but rather on what the CEC decision-makers and the parties
believe constitutes a persistent pattern of failure to enforce one's
environmental laws. However, the NAAEC does provide objectives and
goals that provide guidance for making decisions. Also, the NAAEC
incorporates International Environmental Customary Law as a basis for
decision-making. This customary law principle is that each country is able
to use their resources and pollute their land until it harms another
country."rs Therefore, the NAAEC provides some framework to be
applied in decision-making, but an objective standard needs to be imposed
to avoid biased decisions.
The power of the CEC panel to issue sanctions and suspend NAFTA
benefits is a very effective way to encourage compliance. The NAAEC
needs this power in order to be successful, ensuring compliance to the
sanctions. "'
IV. SOCIETAL FACTORS
Several societal factors challenge the NAAEC's success. First, each
member has a very different history and ideology. Mexico appears to be
changing its old belief that economic growth and environmental regulation
183. Within 180 days after the last panelist is chosen, the panel must issue the initial
report and within sixty days after the initial report's issuance, a final report must be presented.
These time limits force the panel to work efficiently and to reach a decision as soon as possible.
Id.
184. This feature of the NAAEC sets this agreement apart from the various United StatesMexico and United States - Canada bi-national environmental agreements mentioned earlier.
Outcome enforcement is a key factor for a successful agreement.
185. Giorgio, supra note 47, at 168.
186. Each member country may have different interest regarding environmental
protection, but with the NAAEC, they are able to combine their interests through cooperation.
Through cooperation, under the NAFTA and the NAAEC, the members are able to determine
how far they want to go with free trade and how far they want to go with environmental
protection. By reaching these determinations together, they are strengthening relations, creating a
better environment, and encouraging economic growth.

216

ILSA Journal of International& ComparativeLaw [Vol. 5:185

can not go hand in hand. Based on the General Law, Mexico is becoming
concerned about pollution in the border area and the rapid spread of
disease that has resulted." 7 People living on the border are being injured
by the maquiladora pollution and have no recourse under Mexican law.
The United States on the other hand, is economically advanced and has a
lot of experience with environmental law, legislation and litigation. 8 ' The
United States environmental laws provide a safe environment for its
citizens, plus the right of action in the United States court system if a
citizen is injured.' 89 Canada is very similar to the United States and has
strengthened relations with the United States through several successful binational environmental and trade agreements.' "
One of the biggest
obstacles for the NAAEC will be trying to get three different countries to
interpret and comply with the NAAEC in a similar manner. However, the
NAAEC would not be in existence if not for the commitment of the United
States, Mexico, and Canada to environmental protection through
cooperation.
Second, the border area is a unique area because there are many
socially and economically linked communities called sister cities on each
side of the border.' 9 ' These communities are a result of the border area's
disparate division. The West Side of the border was divided and plotted by
surveyors without concern for mountains, rivers, and other terrain. "9 The
East Side'was more naturally divided and, before 1848, the Rio Grande
was entirely in Mexico, but it was later divided so that parts of the river
were in both countries. 19 This has created a challenge for the NAAEC
because the United States and Mexico suffer from the same environmental
problems but have very different cultures, laws and economic conditions."
In addition, the border area contains many different ecological zones, such
as, mountains, deserts, rivers and ocean making environmental protection
more complex. 9" Therefore, in order to protect the environment, the

187. However, Mexican citizens are very poor and many have moved to the boarder area
for work and believe they are better off now then they were before. Ribadeneira, supra note 1, at
10.
188. Stanton, supra note 4, at 76.
189. Robbins, supra note 24, at 136.
190. "The friendly relationship between the United States and Canada has been responsible
in large part for the successes in negotiating agreements over transboundary issues, such as
pollution and water boundaries, because many of these agreements rely on voluntary negotiations
to work out disputes." Stanton, supra note 4, at 78-79.
191. Gaines, supra note 6, at 435.
192. Id. at 436.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 435.
195. Id.
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NAAEC needs to promote cooperation so that the member countries can
work together in solving the environmental problems they encounter.
Overall, the three member countries realize the need to protect the
environment on border areas. Mexico has come to understand that a stable
environment is necessary for economic growth. Through the NAAEC,
private individuals and NGOs are able to bring forth claims to encourage
accountability, to make others aware of how laws are or are not being
enforced and to clean-up the border area where Mexican and American
citizens live and work. Despite the obstacles involved, the NAAEC, as
does the NAFTA, stands for cooperation and indicates the potential for
further unification in the future.
V. CONCLUSION

Since the NAAEC is rather new it is difficult to fully analyze its
impact or success. The NAAEC was a necessary addition to the NAFTA
in order to protect the environment against economic growth. Although the
NAAEC was created in response to the border area pollution, this
agreement governs all environmental issues involving the United States,
Mexico and Canada.
The recommendations provided above serve to clarify vague
provisions, provide private individuals with a forum in which to seek
damages, limit the Council's unfettered power and to make the CEC
dispute resolution process advocate cooperation."
The United States,
Mexico and Canada must establish specific environmental standards for
each member to attain, that is objective and reasonable for all parties and
that do not create trade barriers.
The future holds two challenges to the NAAEC and to international
environmental protection in general. In May of 1998 the Multilateral
Agreement on Investment may be ratified. 9' This agreement threatens
environmental protection because it would prohibit governments from98
imposing certain restrictions on foreign businesses and investors.
Canada and twenty-eight other countries are involved in the agreement.'99
Many believe "the MAI will [not] provide anything more then token
environmental protections.""
The challenge is not only a limit to
196. As mentioned earlier, international cooperation is essential for international
environmental protection. Despite prior unsuccessful environmental agreements, the NAAEC
members are committed to environmental protection. They have no choice. If the United States,
Mexico, and Canada want economic growth they must protect the enforcement also.
197. Ruth Abramson, Paying the Polluters?: A New Treaty Could Bring Investors and
Controversy, MACLEAN'S, Sept. 1, 1997 at 68.
198. Id.
199. Id. "The lack of public discussion, combined with the complexity of the 175-page
MAI draft, means that most Canadians are still in the dark about its contents."
200. Id.
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environmental regulations on foreign businesses, but also Canada's
membership in the MAI. Canada will be bound to the MAI and also to the
NAAEC and the NAFTA, which supports economic growth along with
environmental protection. This could frustrate relations with the United
States and Mexico, while restricting Canada's ability to meet NAAEC
obligations.
A second important concern for the future is the Kyoto Protocol. This
agreement will require the United States to cut emissions by approximately
eighteen percent."' It could ultimately result in the United States building
new nuclear power plants and eliminating the use of coal.'
Industry
leaders are concerned because the Kyoto Protocol "doesn't allow enough
time to reduce emissions without inflicting massive damage on the
economy." 2 3
Rapid change is often unsuccessful and may cause
resistance. Some suggest that industry and the government should work
together to develop the technology required to meet the Kyoto Protocol
standards. 2' Therefore, this agreement also presents the tension between
environmental protection and economic growth.
The international world will always have the problem of balancing the
industrial world with the needs of the environment. However, cooperation
between nations is necessary, in order to responsibly protect the
environment while promoting economic growth. The world may never
find the ultimate balance, but by establishing strategies through cooperation
it is making progress.

201. Martha M. Hamilton & Curt Suplee, The Price of Achieving Kyoto Goals; U.S. to
Consider Range of Options, Technologies if Pact Advances, THE WASH. POST., December 12,
1997, at § A.
202. Id. Coal provides over half of the nation's electricity.
203. Id.
204. Id.

